JUANA SUMMERS, HOST:
Two days of negotiations in Saudi Arabia over a ceasefire and the war in Ukraine have ended without a signed deal. And Russia and Ukraine don't even seem to agree over the terms of a limited 30-day ceasefire that each side already committed to in principle last week. It's a measure of just how little trust there is in the relationship. One big reason for that is a long string of agreements broken by Russia. Serhii Plokhii is a historian at Harvard University, and I asked him to walk through it, starting with a 1994 agreement called the Budapest Memorandum, signed just a few years after Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union.
SERHII PLOKHII: So once the Soviet Union fell apart, the huge Soviet nuclear arsenal ended up to be stationed on the territory of now four independent states, and Ukraine inherited the biggest chunk of that, aside from Russia. So what happened in Budapest in 1994 - and at that time, the president of the United States was Bill Clinton - was that Ukraine and other states that inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal were provided with assurances for their territorial integrity and for their security in exchange for turning the nuclear weapons to Russia, and United States played a very important role in that negotiation. So Ukrainians were extremely concerned at that time. The nuclear weapons was the only deterrent that they had against Russia. That was happening at the time when Russia was making claims for Ukrainian territory. So Ukraine found itself in impossible situation and had to agree to the deal.
SUMMERS: And of course, we know that that agreement - the Budapest Memorandum - did not end up protecting Ukraine. In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea - part of Ukraine - which brings us to another Russia-Ukraine deal, the Minsk agreements. Tell us what those laid out.
PLOKHII: The annexation of the Crimea really became an opening stage for the war between Russia and Ukraine because the next move that Russia did, they were trying also to annex the eastern part of Ukraine called Donbas. A few weeks after the fighting, the first Minsk agreements were reached, which was a - sort of the armistice at that time. And what happened was after Minsk 1, Russia decided that it was not really satisfied with the amount of territory that it had and the conditions that it imposed on Ukraine. So they resumed the military action in early 2015 and then led to Minsk 2, which was more in alliance with their original plans. So we have this story of armistice agreements that was signed and violated again and again by the Russian Federation. People are concerned that that will - can happen again.
SUMMERS: What lessons do you think Ukraine takes away from this history of broken promises as they are potentially heading towards another agreement with Russia?
PLOKHII: One thing is that there is a belief that giving up nuclear weapons back in 1994 was a major mistake - that Russia is treated the way it is treated not because it is somehow economic powerhouse, but mostly it is treated that way because it is a nuclear superpower. So the nuclear weapons is the real deterrent. The solution for Ukraine was perceived for a long period of time - was viewed in membership in NATO. That's why President Zelenskyy was keeping talking about NATO again and again and again.
SUMMERS: Right.
PLOKHII: Now, it doesn't look this is possible at all. So for Zelenskyy, for Ukraine, the alliance - continuing alliance with the United States is extremely important. And that alliance is extremely important also for Europe, for stopping Russian aggression. And it is important for the United States of America because if U.S. leaves, the vacuum will be filled, and it's not given that the alliance that Ukraine will sign will be necessarily with Europe. It can be China as well.
SUMMERS: Ukraine is now in a position of negotiating with the same two countries that left it without its nuclear deterrent 30 years ago. I'm talking, of course, about the U.S. and Russia. We've talked so much about the geopolitics of this situation, but I want to ask you about the people. How do people in Ukraine feel about being back in this position again decades later?
PLOKHII: Well, there is a huge concern and huge disappointment. The United States was perceived, despite Budapest Memorandum, as really a flag bearer of democracy and of just peace. There was belief that there was also a level of democratic solidarity in the world. People in Ukraine now realize that it is not there, or at least it is not on the level that they believed it was. So yeah, huge disappointment, cynicism - the realization, OK, there is no one else but yourself to count on.
SUMMERS: We have been speaking with Serhii Plokhii. He's director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Thank you so much.
PLOKHII: You're most welcome, Juana. Thank you. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.
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